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Three 800-pound Guerillas

Two Failing Business Models: GM and the Iraq War

August 2006 By Denny Hatch

In the News

Generals Raise Fears of Iraq Civil War
WASHINGTON --The top U.S. military commander in the Middle East told Congress on Thursday that “Iraq could move toward civil war” if the raging sectarian violence in Baghdad is not stopped. “I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I have seen it,” Gen. John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said the top priority in the Iraq war is to secure the capital, where factional violence has surged in recent weeks despite efforts by the new Iraqi government to stop the fighting.
—Anne Plummer Flaherty, Associated Press, August 3, 2006

Meanwhile last month Toyota—with its slick little Scion, Lexus and Prius hybrid models—sold 426 units more than Ford, catapulting it into second place. “Toyota Drove to the Bank in a Ford,” proclaimed Michelle Maynard’s headline in this past Sunday’s New York Times.

The War on Terror as a Failing Business Model
The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center was the modern-day equivalent to the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. That means as of today our military involvement in the Middle East has gone on for one year, 10 weeks and three days longer than that of World War II.

In the 3-1/2 years of World War II, the Allies subdued the most powerful, vicious military machines in world history and liberated a vast swath of the globe—Europe, North Africa, Asia and the Far East.

For 3-1/2 years, the Allies dropped everything and committed their entire resources to quashing this horrific threat. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin realized that there is no such thing as being a little bit pregnant.

After 4-1/2 years in the Middle East, Americans are still being blown to bits inside two small, fourth-rate powers that are consumed by sectarian violence.

“It is now obvious that we are not midwifing democracy in Iraq,” Tom Friedman wrote last Friday in the Times. “We are baby-sitting a civil war.”

Something is seriously wrong with the Pentagon’s business model

The Lessons of Dien Bien Phu
Starting in March 2003 the United States and Britain executed a dagger thrust to Baghdad with a highly mobile, skeleton force. Instead of putting up a fight, the trained and brutal Iraqi fighters melted into the countryside, taking their weapons and ammunition with them, and looted the arms depots that were never secured by the coalition troops.

The result: For the past 3-1/2 years, the Iraq War has been fought entirely behind enemy lines.

The situation is reminiscent of the Dien Bien Phu debacle—March 13 to May 7, 1954—that planted the seeds of our involvement in Vietnam.

The French set up a base in the lowlands of Vietnam. The intent was to cut off supply lines into Laos of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Forces (Viet Minh). The only way to supply the Dien Bien Phu garrison was for French troops and cargo to be flown in over the surrounding hills.

The Viet Minh secretly lugged heavy artillery up the unseen sides of the high hills and positioned these weapons at the top, just out of sight of the French defenders who were now completely surrounded. Spotters took up hidden positions in the hills and began directing lethal fire into the French garrison below.

At the end of 56 days of carnage, the French capitulated with a total of 19,298 killed, wounded or captured (roughly the equivalent of our losses in Iraq). The Viet Minh suffered 7,900 dead and 15,000 wounded.

As with the French in Dien Bien Phu, U.S. military forces are completely surrounded on all sides and by violent, heavily armed fanatics. In the words of the Times’ Friedman, they “hate us more than they love their kids.”

Anyone who ventures outside the safety of Baghdad’s Green Zone is immediately subject to surprise attack from any direction.

Al Qaeda (and Hezbollah) do not engage in pitched battles with large numbers of troops. Small groups of highly trained and well-armed operatives make sudden devastating strikes and melt away to fight another day.

In his brilliant 2004 book, “Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror,” ex-CIA operative Michael Scheuer cites the first rule insurgency: “Never give the enemy a target that lets him defeat you in one campaign.”

Scheuer goes on to point out:

Bin Laden also has veteran al Qaeda administrators and logisticians in Iraq who can—as they did in the Soviet-Afghan war—greet, shelter, feed, arm, and train Muslim volunteers flowing to Iraq from around the Islamic world.


Quite simply, our military and the Iraqi people are being nibbled to death by Saddam Hussein’s best-trained, nastiest military operatives who deserted during the allied invasion. A seemingly endless chain of human kamikazes from all over the Arab world who fervently wish to kill everybody in sight and die themselves reinforces them.

As of Sunday (8/06/06), the total of U.S. military personnel killed and wounded in Iraq is 21,368—and counting. Iraqi civilians—adults and children—are being murdered at the rate of 100 a day, caught in the vortex of Sunni-Shi’a insanity.

One Way Out
If the occupying forces could gradually push the borders of the Green Zone outward in all directions and secure more and more of Baghdad until all the criminal insurgents were standing in the desert looking in, maybe victory could be claimed.

It would require 230,000 or more additional boots on the ground—roughly the original 2002 estimates by the Pentagon of what was needed, a number that Rumsfeld nixed at the outset as being politically unacceptable to the American people—a number that would require reviving the draft.

Instead America is betting that 400,000 needed fighters will be made up of Iraqis—30-day wonders trained by the United States—to take over for our troops now stretched to the breaking point.

The Poker Analogy
In 1947 my father was commissioned by the old Liberty magazine to write a series of articles on the 1948 presidential candidates. His last question in each of his interviews was this: “In poker do you draw to an inside straight?”

New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey (the odds-on favorite) thought a moment and replied, “Never.”

Harry S. Truman (the incumbent long shot who won) replied instantly, “Always.”

With its present Middle East policy, the Pentagon and the Administration are drawing to an inside straight flush.

This is no way to deal with a failing business model.

P.S. If a reader can describe a successful military campaign at any time in history where the occupying forces were completely surrounded by a hostile, heavily armed enemy that was continually increasing in size and ferocity, please e-mail me.

P.P.S. I am taking a long weekend. Look for your next issue of “Business Common Sense” on Tuesday, August 15th (my 71st birthday—ouch!).

Takeaway Points to Consider:

* It might pay to undertake an annual review of your business model—sources of revenue, expenses, efficiency—for possible tweaks or improvements to test.

* If you find your business model going steadily south, is it smart to “stay the course” and ride it into oblivion? Or should hard choices be made?

* Michael Scheuer in his marvelous “Imperial Hubris” described how his first supervisor in the CIA told him to tackle a problem. Scheuer is referring to intelligence, but this system can work for analyzing any business challenge:
First do the “checkables.” The checkables were those parts of a problem that were knowable, the things on which there were classified archival records, pertinent and available human experience, current human assets to consult, or even the results of media and academic research—the latter then, as now, generally underused because of the false assumption that information is not useful unless classified. This supervisor’s recipe was to exploit to exhaustion the “checkables” to lean the problem’s history and context, determine precisely what we already knew, establish the range of things we knew little or nothing about, and, thereby, identify the information we needed to acquire before acting to resolve the problem.


* AOL represents a failing business model where radical surgery is being applied in an attempt to save it. The July 13, 2006 edition of this e-zine was devoted to “The Decline and Fall of AOL: The Trashing of a Money Machine and a Great Brand.” Ten days following publication, TV interviewer Charlie Rose asked AOL founder Steve Case about the merger he engineered with Time Warner. “I’m sorry I did it,” Case admitted. On August 1, 2006, AOL announced it would no longer charge for high-speed Internet access, relying instead on increased advertising to fuel its growth. Forty-eight hours later, AdAge.com reported that AOL was losing 325,000 paying customers a day. The following day, AOL announced 5,000 employees—more than one-quarter of its work force—would be axed over the next six months.

* AOL is not riding its failing business model into oblivion but making sweeping changes in an attempt to save it.

* There is no such thing as being a little bit pregnant.

* “You become responsible, forever, for what you have tamed.”
_The Fox to the Little Prince, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

Web Sites Related to Today's Edition:

Charles E. Wilson
http://tinyurl.com/lpqc9

Michael Scheuer
http://tinyurl.com/4vms5

Iraq Coalition Casualties
http://icasualties.org/oif/
 

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